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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXII
Competency Of Medical Witnesses As Experts
On Disability In Negligence
Shivers v. Carnaggio
On the facts described at the beginning of the preceding
Note, the Court of Appeals, in reaching the conclusion
that the proffered testimony should have been received,
found that the medical witnesses had sufficient familiarity
with the activities and occupation of plaintiff2 to enable
them to express an opinion on the extent to which the
injury to her back would cause personal and economic
loss;' and also that without the aid of this medical testi-
mony the jury could not have reached a proper conclusion
in its deliberation. 4
The issue of the competency of medical witnesses to
render opinions on disability was raised in an article
appearing in the American Medical Association Journal;
the conclusion there reached is in accord with the position
taken by the trial court: a physician is not expert on the
effect of physical impairment on job performance and is
usually unqualified to evaluate social and economic effects
of impairment.5 The article draws a distinction between
impairment, which is said to be a purely medical problem,
and disability, which is affected by various non-medical
factors and involves a patient's ability to engage in gain-
ful activity.6
1223 Md. 585, 165 A. 2d 898 (1960).
'Id., 588-589.
'A search of the appeal briefs of the parties, and the trial testimony as
included in the Court of Appeals' decision reveals a complete lack of any
such testimony.
' One of WIGMORE'S 'tests on the admissibility of opinion testimony is:
"On this subject can a jury from this person receive appreciable help?"
7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 1923. There is ample authority for
the view that it is not within the realm of medical expertise to interpret
the effect of physical limitation on a person's ability to engage in gainful
employment.
'Journal of the American Medical Association, Special Edition, Feb. 15,
1958, written by the Committee on Medical Rating of Physical Impairment,
after careful study of the problem and the views of numerous medical
authorities.
'Ibid. "The following explanations of generally-used terms in programs
for the disabled will suffice for all practical purposes:
"1. Permanent Disability. This is not a purely medical condition.
A patient is 'permanently disabled' or under a 'permanent disability'
when his actual or presumed ability to engage in gainful activity is
reduced or absent because of 'impairment' and no fundamental or
marked change in the future can be expected.
"2. Permanent Impairment. This is a purely medical condition.
Permanent impairment is any antomic or functional abnormality or
loss after maximal medical rehabilitation has been achieved and which
abnormality or loss the physician considers stable or non-progressive
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The negligence cases found in Maryland touching on
this problem are inconclusive. The Court of Appeals was
free to adopt either the distinction drawn by the Shivers
trial court and the American Medical Association, or any
other rule which it felt better suited.' For example, in
Adams v. Benson' a dermatologist testified that since the
plaintiff was unable to make a complete dorsal flexion of
her wrist, he estimated the disability at ten per cent. The
opinion did not clearly indicate whether this testimony was
objected to; but even assuming that it was, it is obvious
from the way in which the dermatologist answered the
question that he was not speaking of economic disabiltiy,
but rather of limitation of movement, i.e., anatomical loss
of use.
In Williams v. Dawidowicz9 a doctor testified that the
plaintiff who had operated a precision screw machine had
a limitation in the motion of his left wrist of about fifty
per cent. Then another witness who had been operating
at the time evaluation is made. It is always a basic consideration in
evaluation of permanent disability. It should be remembered, however,
that permanent impairment is a contributory factor to, but not neces-
sarily an indication of the extent of a patient's permanent disability.
"3. Evaluation (Rating) of Permanent Disability. This is an admin-
istrative, not medical, responsibility and function. Evaluation of
permanent disability Is an appraisal of the patient's present and prob-
able future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by non-
medical factors such as age, sex, education, economic and social en-
vironment and the medical factor - permanent impairment. Non-
medical factors have proved extremely difficult to measure. For this
reason 'permanent impairment' is, in fact, the sole or real criterion
of 'permanent disability' far more often than is readily acknowledged.
Evaluation of permanent disability forms the basis for a determination
of permanent disability which is an administrative decision as to the
patient's entitlement.
"4. Evaluation (Rating) of Permanent Impairment. This is a func-
tion which physicians alone are competent to perform. Evaluation of
permanent impairment defines the scope of medical responsibility and,
therefore, represents the physician's role in the evaluation of permanent
disability. Evaluation of permanent impairment is an appraisal of
the nature and extent of the patient's illness or injury as it affects
his personal efficiency in the activities of daily living. These activities
are self care, normal living postures, ambulation, elevation, traveling
and non-specialized hand activities. It is not and never can be the
duty of physicians to evaluate the social and economic effects of
permanent impairment. These effects must be evaluated by adminis-
tractors In making determinations of permanent disability.
"Competent evaluation of permanent impairment requires adequate
and complete medical examination, accurate objective measurement of
function and avoidance of subjective impressions and non-medical
factors such as the patient's age, sex or employability."
Many cases are in the Workmen's Compensation area. Expert testi-
mony as to the permanency of an impairment is admittedly allowed in
Maryland. See Cogswell v. Frazier, 183 Md. 654, 39 A. 2d 815 (1944) and
cases therein cited.
11208 Md. 261, 117 A. 2d 881 (1955).
9 209 Md. 77, 120 A. 2d 399 (1956).
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the same type of machine for twenty-nine years was
allowed, over objection, to answer a hypothetical question
that a man so limited was not competent to operate the
screw machine.
A Fourth Circuit decision, Standard Oil Co. v. Sewell,0
held merely that it was not reversible error for a doctor,
after testifying as to the nature of the injuries, to state
that the plaintiff would have a total permanent disability
of fifty per cent. Also, Isaac Benesch & Sons v. Ferkler"
is of little assistance, for in that case the attending doctor
was asked the effect of the injuries on the nervous condi-
tion of the appellee and on her ability to perform her house-
hold duties, this being from personal observation.
Outside of Maryland various positions have been
adopted. Some courts have held that a doctor can give
his opinion as to how far a patient's personal and economic
activities would be curtailed. Some have limited opinions
to everyday simple activities. Others have completely
denied such testimony. 2
In Price v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 3 the Utah
Court, like the Shivers trial court, concluded that doctors
may testify as to the amount of anatomical impairment of
a bodily member. But it held that unless they clearly
know what bodily activities a vocation embraces, doctors
can not testify as to the percentage of industrial or eco-
nomic disability consequent on the loss of certain physical
functions. It is noteworthy that this case was remanded
10 37 F. 2d 230 (4th Cir. 1930).
-153 Md. 680, 139 A. 557 (1927).
2Mintz v. Atlantic Line R. Co., 236 N.C. 109, 72 S.E. 2d 38 (1952)
admitted -a doctor's opinion that patient could not do any kind of work;
DeVore v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 103 Mont. 599, 64 P. 2d 1071
(1937) admitted a doctor's opinion that patient could not engage in an
occupation requiring physical effort: Marland Refining Co. v. McClung,
102 Okla. 56, 226 P. 312 (1924) admitted a doctor's opinion that skull
injury would interfere with plaintiff's occupational ability; Southern
Underwriters v. Knight, 107 S.W. 2d 1097 (Tex. 1937) allowed testimony
that a back injury would prevent manual labor; Southwest Metals Co. v.
Gomez, 4 F. 2d 215 (9th Cir. 1925) a doctor's opinion on plaintiff's ability
,to earn a living allowed; Corrigan v. United States, 82 F. 2d 106
(9th Cir. 1936).
Cases limiting such testimony to simple activities are Silver King Coali-
tion M. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 92 Utah 511, 69 P. 2d 608 (1937)
Price v. Industrial Commission, 91 Utah 152, 63 P. 2d 592 (1937).
Testimony expressed' in percentages was allowed in Standard Oil Co. v.
Sewell, 37 F. 2d 230 (4th Cir. 1930); Ott v. Perrin, 116 Ind. App. 189,
63 N.E. 2d 163, 166 (1945); Acme-Evans Co. v. Schnepf, 14 N.E. 2d 561
(Ind. 1938) ; -Seal v. Blackburn Tank Truck Service, 64 N.M. 282, 327 P. 2d
797, 800 (1958); Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Harris, 138
S.W. 2d 277, 278 (Tex. 1940).
-091 Utah 152, 63 P. 2d 592 (1937).
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to the Commission specifically to take testimony on the
duties of a fireman, which was the claimant's occupation.
The policy argument of not permitting a doctor without
special knowledge to testify can be seen from this practical
example. A musician, or golf professional would be seri-
ously disabled by the loss of a finger while a lawyer orjudge suffering from the same injury would at most be
only slightly disabled. A physician without detailed knowl-
edge of these non-medical factors involved obviously be-
comes unqualified to answer."
One proper method of getting "disability" testimony
before a jury would seem to be to have the injured party
himself testify as to his physical and vocational limita-
tions, this being followed by expert medical testimony on
physical impairment. Another equally acceptable way,
and one which was followed in Maryland in Williams v.
Dawidowicz,15 would be to call in an expert on the occupa-
tion in question, after medical testimony as to impairment
has been given, and allow the occupational expert to an-
swer a hypothetical question based on the limitation of
motion allegedly suffered by the plaintiff.
Silver King Coalition M. Co. v. Industrial Commission6
set forth a compromise position in which the court held
that where testimony is as to common activities, such as
housework, climbing ladders, digging, etc., a doctor can
state the patient's ability to function - it being presumed
that the doctor has knowledge of the physical movements
employed in these activities. Perhaps this compromise posi-
tion of allowing medical testimony as to common activi-
ties is the explanation for the opinion in the Shivers case
since the vocation in question was only housework. But
the Court of Appeals did not in any way indicate that such
was its viewpoint - nor did it express that such a pre-
sumption of medical knowledge as to common activities
exist in Maryland. The soundness of this compromise posi-
tion is placed in doubt, at any rate, when we consider that
any man of average intelligence sitting on a jury should
presumably know the functions and duties of a housewife,
and thus there is no necessity in the first place to present
evidence by one supposedly better qualified because of
medical skill or training.
This brings the problem full circle. If we say a doctor,
because of his special training, is qualified to determine
14 "Disability" has reference to wage earning ability. Miller v. McGraw
Co., 184 Md. 529, 540, 42 A. 2d 237 (1945) and cases therein cited.
15Supra, n. 9.
1692 Utah 511, 69 P. 2d 608 (1937).
1962]
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the extent to which anatomical impairment will cause
economic disability, we must first actually determine that
the doctor has certain extra-medical knowledge of his
patient. If he lacks this extra-medical knowledge his com-
petency to answer should be challenged. But, if the extra-
medical factor is uncomplicated, there is a lack of neces-
sity for admitting expert opinion on the point. As has been
determined, the only reason expert opinion evidence is
admitted is because the jury would be hard pressed or
unable to reach a proper conclusion without it.
The Shivers jury being apprised of anatomical disa-
bility by the medical witnesses, backed up by the plaintiff's
own testimony as to her physical and economic condition
could have reached a proper conclusion. This was the trial
court's position. The reversal on this ground by the Court
of Appeals is unfortunate.
DONALD NEEDLE.
Admissibility Of Opinions In Dying Declarations
Connor v. State'
Defendant left the house of his former wife, the de-
cedent, after an argument between the two, and entered
his parked car. The decedent followed him, and while
standing at the door of the car demanded a promised
payment of $25. The defendant refused, and the decedent
moved directly in front of the car. As the defendant started
to slowly drive forward, the decedent refused to move
aside, and instead walked backward. There came a time
when the defendant did not "see her any more" at which
time he "gave it [the automobile] the gas." With this, the
automobile moved rapidly forward and crushed the de-
cedent, causing her death some fourteen hours later. The
defendant appealed from a second degree murder convic-
tion on the ground, inter alia, that evidence admitted at
the trial of a statement made by decedent to a policeman
at the scene of the crime, in which she classified the defen-
dant's act as "no accident," was inadmissible as a dying
declaration due to its opinion form. The Maryland Court
of Appeals, in a case of first impression, rejected defen-
dant's argument and stated that a dying declaration is not
1225 Md. 543, 171 A. 2d 699 (1961).
